Cartel Act (CartA)
English is not an official language of the Swiss Confederation. This translation is provided for information purposes only and has no legal force.
Section 1 Unlawful Restraints of Competition
Art. 5 Unlawful agreements affecting competition
1 Agreements that significantly restrict competition in a market for specific goods or services and are not justified on grounds of economic efficiency, and all agreements that eliminate effective competition are unlawful. 2 Agreements affecting competition are deemed to be justified on grounds of economic efficiency if: a. they are necessary in order to reduce production or distribution costs, improve products or production processes, promote research into or dissemination of technical or professional know-how, or exploit resources more rationally; and b. they will under no circumstances enable the parties involved to eliminate effective competition. 3 The following agreements between actual or potential competitors are presumed to lead to the elimination of effective competition: a. agreements to directly or indirectly fix prices; b. agreements to limit the quantities of goods or services to be produced, purchased or supplied; c. agreements to allocate markets geographically or accor
Para. 4 — Inserted by No I of the FA of 20 June 2003, in force since 1 April 2004 (AS 2004 1385 1390; BBl 2002 2022 5506).
Art. 6 Categories of agreements affecting competition that are deemed justified
1 The conditions under which agreements affecting competition are as a general rule deemed justified on grounds of economic efficiency may be set out in ordinances or general notices. In doing so the following agreements will be taken into consideration in particular: a. co-operation agreements relating to research and development; b. specialisation and rationalisation agreements, including agreements concerning the use of tools for calculating costs; c. agreements granting exclusive rights to purchase or sell certain goods or services; d. agreements granting exclusive licences for intellectual property rights; e. agreements that have the purpose of improving the competitiveness of small and medium-sized undertakings, provided their effect on the market is limited. 2 Such ordinances and general notices may also recognise particular forms of co-operation specific to certain sectors of the economy as being generally justified, in particular agreements concerning the effective implementat
Para. 1 let. e — Inserted by No I of the FA of 20 June 2003, in force since 1 April 2004 (AS 2004 1385 1390; BBl 2002 2022 5506).
Art. 7 Unlawful practices by dominant undertakings and undertakings with relative market power
1 Dominant undertakings and undertakings with relative market power behave unlawfully if, by abusing their position in the market, they hinder other undertakings from starting or continuing to compete, or disadvantage trading partners. 2 The following behaviour is in particular considered unlawful: a. any refusal to deal (e.g. refusal to supply or to purchase goods); b. any discrimination between trading partners in relation to prices or other conditions of trade; c. any imposition of unfair prices or other unfair conditions of trade; d. any under-cutting of prices or other conditions directed against a specific competitor; e. any limitation of production, supply or technical development; f. any conclusion of contracts on the condition that the other contracting party agrees to accept or deliver additional goods or services; g. the restriction of the opportunity for buyers to purchase goods or services offered both in Switzerland and abroad at the market prices and conditions customary
Art. 7 — Amended by No I of the FA of 19 March 2021, in force since 1 Jan. 2022 (AS 2021 576; BBl 2019 4877). Para. 1 — Amended by No I of the FA of 19 March 2021, in force since 1 Jan. 2022 (AS 2021 576; BBl 2019 4877). Para. 2 let. g — Inserted by No I of the FA of 19 March 2021, in force since 1 Jan. 2022 (AS 2021 576; BBl 2019 4877).
Art. 8 Exceptional authorisation for compelling public interest reasons
Agreements affecting competition and behaviour by dominant undertakings that have been declared unlawful by the competent authority may be authorised by the Federal Council at the request of the undertakings involved if, in exceptional cases, they are necessary for compelling public interest reasons.
Section 2 Concentrations of Undertakings
Art. 9 Notification of planned concentrations
1 Planned concentrations of undertakings must be notified to the Competition Commission before their implementation if in the financial year preceding the concentration: a. the undertakings concerned together reported a turnover of at least 2 billion Swiss francs, or a turnover in Switzerland of at least 500 million Swiss francs, and b. at least two of the undertakings concerned each reported a turnover in Switzerland of at least 100 million Swiss francs. 2 … 3 In the case of insurance companies, «turnover» is replaced by «annual gross insurance premium income», and in the case of banks and other financial intermediaries that are subject to the accounting regulations set out in the Banking Act of 8 November 1934 by «gross income». 4 Notwithstanding anything set out in paragraphs 1 to 3 above, notification is mandatory if one of the undertakings concerned has in proceedings under this Act in a final and non-appealable decision been held to be dominant in a market in Switzerland, and if
Para. 2 — Repealed by No I of the FA of 20 June 2003, with effect from 1 April 2004 (AS 2004 1385 1390; BBl 2002 2022 5506). Para. 3 — SR 952.0 Para. 3 — Amended by No I of the FA of 20 June 2003, in force since 1 April 2004 (AS 2004 1385 1390; BBl 2002 2022 5506).
Art. 10 Assessment of concentrations
1 Concentrations that have to be notified shall be investigated by the Competition Commission if a preliminary assessment (Art. 32 para. 1) reveals that they create or strengthen a dominant position. 2 The Competition Commission may prohibit a concentration or authorise it subject to conditions and obligations if the investigation indicates that the concentration: a. creates or strengthens a dominant position liable to eliminate effective competition; and b. does not improve the conditions of competition in another market such that the harmful effects of the dominant position can be outweighed. 3 If a concentration of banks within the meaning of the Banking Act is deemed necessary by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) for reasons related to creditor protection, the interests of creditors may be given priority. In these cases, FINMA takes the place of the Competition Commission, which it shall invite to submit an opinion. 4 In assessing the effects of a concentrati
Para. 3 — SR 952.0 Para. 3 — Amended by Annex No 8 of the Financial Market Supervision Act of 22 June 2007, in force since 1 Jan. 2009 (AS 2008 5207; BBL 2006 2829).
Art. 11 Exceptional authorisation for compelling public reasons
A concentration of undertakings that has been prohibited in accordance with Article 10 may be authorised by the Federal Council at the request of the undertakings involved if, in exceptional cases, it is necessary for compelling public interest reasons.