National Bank Ordinance (NBO)
Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
English is not an official language of the Swiss Confederation. This translation is provided for information purposes only and has no legal force.
Section 1 Determination of Systemically Important
Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 18 Disclosure obligation
1 The disclosure obligation specified in Article 20 paragraph 1 NBA applies to: a. payment systems which settle payments in excess of CHF 25 billion (gross) per financial year; b. central securities depositories; c. central counterparties. 2 The disclosure obligation already applies prior to the payment system, central securities depository or central counterparty starting operations; however, it applies to payment systems only if it is to be expected that the value of payments stated in paragraph 1 letter a will be attained in the first year after the system starts operations.
Art. 19 Procedure
1 The National Bank shall issue an order designating systemically important financial market infrastructures and their systemically important business processes pursuant to Article 22 FinMIA. 2 The National Bank shall request from the operator the necessary information and documentation, and set the deadline and the format for their submission. 3 Before designating a financial market infrastructure as systemically important and determining its systemically important business processes, the National Bank shall provide the operator with the opportunity to express an opinion. If the operator is a financial market infrastructure subject to authorisation in accordance with Article 4 FinMIA, the National Bank shall consult FINMA.
Para. 1 — SR 958.1
Art. 20 Criteria for systemically important financial market infrastructures
In determining whether a payment system, central securities depository or central counterparty is important for the stability of the Swiss financial system in accordance with Article 22 paragraph 1 FinMIA, the National Bank shall, in particular, take the following factors into account: a. the transactions that are cleared or settled through the financial market infrastructure, and in particular whether they are foreign exchange, money market, capital market or derivatives transactions, or are transactions that serve to implement monetary policy; b. the transaction volumes and amounts cleared or settled through the financial market infrastructure; c. the currencies in which transactions are cleared or settled through the financial market infrastructure; d. the number, nominal value and currency of issue of the financial instruments held in central custody or under management by the financial market infrastructure; e. the participants of the financial market infrastructure; f. the financ
SR 958.1
Art. 20a and 21
Repealed
Section 2 Special Requirements for Systemically Im
Amended by No I of the SNB O of 10 June 2013, in force since 1 July 2013 (AS 2013 1987). Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 21a Applicability of special requirements
1 For systemically important financial market infrastructures which are not subject to FINMA authorisation and supervision pursuant to Article 4 FinMIA, the following special requirements shall apply. 2 For systemically important financial market infrastructures which are subject to FINMA authorisation and supervision pursuant to Article 4 FinMIA, the requirements specified in Article 23, Article 24 paragraphs 4 to 6, Article 24a, Article 25c, Article 27 paragraphs 1 and 2, Articles 28–28d, Article 29, Article 30 paragraphs 1 and 3, Articles 32–32c, and Article 34, as well as Section 3, with the exception of Article 36 paragraph 1 letter h, shall apply.
Art. 21a — Inserted by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307). Para. 1 — SR 958.1
Art. 22 Governance and organisation
1 The operator shall have appropriate corporate governance rules and procedures in place. These include, in particular: a. an organisational structure and framework which define the tasks, responsibilities, powers and reporting duties of the board of directors, the senior management and the internal audit function; b. a risk management framework for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of risk; c. a system of internal controls which, inter alia, ensures compliance with statutory, regulatory and internal company rules and regulations (compliance function). 2 The operator shall have mechanisms in place that allow participants’ needs with regard to services provided by the financial market infrastructure to be surveyed. 3 and 4 ...
Para. 3 — Repealed by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, with effect from 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 22a Board of directors, senior management and internal audit
1 The members of the board of directors and senior management shall have an impeccable reputation and shall possess the experience and skills to perform their mandate. The board of directors shall have its performance regularly assessed. 2 The board of directors shall also contain non-executive directors. 3 The board of directors shall specify the basic risk management principles. It shall approve the plans specified in Article 26 and Article 31 paragraph 4, as well as the business continuity strategy and plans specified in Article 32b paragraph 4. 4 The internal audit function shall be independent of the senior management and shall report to the board of directors or one of its committees. It shall be equipped with sufficient resources and shall have unlimited right of review as well as unrestricted access to all documentation, data carriers and information processing systems. 5 ...
Para. 5 — Repealed by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, with effect from 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 22b Documentation and retention
1 The operator shall keep records on the main services provided and activities performed and shall retain all records for a period of ten years. 2 and 3 ...
Para. 2 — Repealed by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, with effect from 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 23 Contractual framework
1 The contractual framework of the financial market infrastructure shall define, in particular: a. the participation requirements as well as the criteria for the suspension and exclusion of a participant; b. the rights and obligations of the operator and the participants; c. the rules and procedures for the operation of the financial market infrastructure; d. the rules and procedures in the event of a participant’s default; e. the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from links with other financial market infrastructures; f. the obligations regarding the delivery of physical instruments or commodities. 2 The operator shall regularly review the effectiveness and enforceability of the contractual framework in all relevant jurisdictions and shall take the necessary measures to limit any legal risks.
Art. 23a Transparency
1 The operator shall publicly disclose key aspects of all information relating to the financial market infrastructure on a regular basis, in particular: a. the design and operation of the financial market infrastructure; b. the operator’s organisational structure; c. the rights and obligations of the participants; d. the participation requirements as well as the criteria for the suspension and exclusion of a participant; e. the rules and procedures in the event of a participant’s default; f. ... g. the aggregate transaction volumes and amounts; h. ... i. the prices and fees charged by the financial market infrastructure for the services it offers, including its conditions for discounts. 2 The operator shall publish information in accordance with the standards set by the relevant international bodies.
Para. 1 let. f — Repealed by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, with effect from 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307). Para. 1 let. h — Repealed by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, with effect from 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 24 Access and exclusion
1 The operator shall grant non-discriminatory and open access to its services. 2 The operator may restrict access provided that this increases the safety or efficiency of the financial market infrastructure, and that such an effect cannot be brought about by any other means. In particular, the operator may make participation conditional upon fulfilment of operational, technical, financial and legal requirements. 3 If an operator restricts access for reasons of efficiency, the National Bank shall consult the Competition Commission as part of its assessment. 4 The operator shall monitor compliance with the participation requirements on an ongoing basis. 5 The operator shall define the criteria and procedure for the suspension and exclusion of participants that no longer fulfil the participation requirements. 6 The operator shall immediately notify the participant of its suspension or exclusion.
Art. 24a Default of a participant
1 The operator shall have appropriate rules and procedures for managing the default of a participant and for minimising credit and liquidity risks for the financial market infrastructure and its participants. These rules and procedures shall enable the operator to meet its obligations when due. 2 In particular, the rules and procedures shall define: a. the sequence in which the operator uses collateral and other financial resources to cover losses (default waterfall); b. how the operator allocates losses that are not covered by collateral and other financial resources; c. how the operator deals with liquidity shortfalls; d. how the operator replenishes collateral and other financial resources that were deployed to cover losses or to bridge liquidity shortfalls following the default of a participant. 3 The operator shall review and test these rules and procedures at least annually.
Art. 24b
Repealed by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, with effect from 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 25 Means of payment
1 Where possible and practicable, the financial market infrastructure shall settle payments by transferring sight deposits at a central bank. 2 Alternatively, the financial market infrastructure shall use a means of payment with no or only low credit and liquidity risks. The operator shall minimise and monitor these risks on an ongoing basis.
Art. 25a Finality
1 The rules of the financial market infrastructure shall determine the point in time after which: a. a participant’s payment order is unconditional and irrevocable; b. a payment is settled. 2 The financial market infrastructure shall settle payments and securities transfers in real time, but at the latest by the end of the value day.
Para. 1 let. b — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 25b Exchange-of-value settlement
The operator of a financial market infrastructure shall enable the participants to eliminate their principal risk by ensuring that for transactions involving the settlement of two linked obligations, the settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the settlement of the other obligation is guaranteed.
Art. 25b — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 25c Central securities depositories
1 A central securities depository shall have appropriate rules, procedures and controls for minimising the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. 2 A central securities depository shall enable its participants to hold the securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form by recording them in a securities account.
Art. 25c — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 26 Recovery and orderly wind-down of systemically important business processes
1 The operator shall identify scenarios that might jeopardise its viability as a going concern, and shall prepare a plan to ensure: a. the recovery or orderly wind-down of systemically important business processes in the event of impending insolvency or other scenarios jeopardising its viability as a going concern; b. the orderly wind-down of systemically important business processes in the event of a voluntary cessation of business. 2 The plan shall, in particular, describe the measures to be taken by the operator as well as the resources required to implement these measures. The plan shall take into account the length of time required for the participants to connect to an alternative financial market infrastructure.
Art. 27 Risk management principles
1 The operator shall have a concept for the integrated identification, measurement, management and monitoring of key risks, especially legal, credit, liquidity, business and operational risks. 2 In defining the procedures and tools to manage credit and liquidity risks, the operator shall take into account their impact on the participants and the financial system. In particular, it shall aim to prevent procyclical effects. 3 The operator shall provide tools and incentives for the participants to continuously manage and contain the risks arising for themselves or for the financial market infrastructure.
Para. 1 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 28 Management of credit risk
1 The operator shall identify, measure, manage and monitor its credit risk through the use of appropriate procedures and tools. 2 The operator shall have sufficient collateral, as specified in Article 28a, to cover current and potential credit exposures to each participant with a high level of confidence. It shall regularly assess compliance with this requirement.
Art. 28a Collateral
1 To cover risk exposures, the operator shall only accept liquid collateral with low credit and market risks. 2 The operator shall value collateral prudently. It shall apply haircuts which are also appropriate under extreme but plausible market conditions and validate them regularly. 3 The operator shall avoid concentration risk in the collateral. In order to diversify the collateral, it shall define concentration limits and monitor compliance with these limits. The operator shall also ensure that no participants post collateral whose value will be substantially reduced in the event of their default. 4 The operator shall ensure that it can access the collateral in a timely manner. This applies, in particular, to collateral which is: a. held in custody abroad; b. issued by foreign issuers; or c. denominated in foreign currency.
Para. 3 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 28b Financial resources and default waterfall of central counterparties
1 A central counterparty shall limit its credit exposure to its participants by collecting collateral as specified in Article 28a in the form of initial margin, variation margin and default fund contributions. 2 A central counterparty shall mark the participants’ collateral and positions to market, and shall collect margin (initial and variation margin) at least once daily when predefined thresholds are exceeded. In addition, it shall have the authority and capability to make intraday margin calls. 3 The margin and the default fund contributions shall cover current and potential credit exposures under a wide range of scenarios. These scenarios shall include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant or group of participants as well as the default of the two participants or two groups of participants against which a central counterparty has the largest potential credit exposure under extreme but plausible market conditions. A group of participants consists of all participant
Art. 28c Calculating a central counterparty’s margin
1 The initial margin of a participant shall cover the potential credit exposure arising from its default for a central counterparty due to expected price movements over an appropriate time horizon with a confidence level of at least 99%. The confidence level for over-the-counter derivatives must be at least 99.5% unless they show the same risk characteristics as exchange-traded derivatives. 2 The appropriate time horizon pursuant to paragraph 1 corresponds to the period from the last variation margin payment up to the expected close-out or hedging of positions in the event of a participant’s default. This horizon shall be at least two business days. For over-the-counter derivatives, the horizon shall be at least five business days, unless they show the same risk characteristics as exchange-traded derivatives. 3 A central counterparty shall base its initial margin calculation on price movements in the financial instruments underlying the positions over at least the previous 12 months. I
Para. 1 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307). Para. 2 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 28d Risk control at central counterparties
1 A central counterparty shall assess: a. by means of daily back tests, whether the initial margin meets the requirements specified in Article 28c paragraph 1; b. by means of daily stress tests, whether the margin and the default fund contributions meet the requirements specified in Article 28b paragraph 3; c. on a monthly basis, how initial margin changes when the assumptions and parameters underlying its calculation vary; d. on a monthly basis, the scenarios, models, assumptions and parameters underlying the stress tests; e. at least annually and in a comprehensive manner, its credit risk management model and the implementation thereof. 2 In the event that a central counterparty identifies shortcomings when performing the tests specified in paragraph 1, it shall make adjustments so as to meet the requirements.
Art. 29 Management of liquidity risk
1 The operator shall identify, measure, manage and monitor its liquidity risk through the use of appropriate procedures and tools. 2 The operator shall have sufficient liquid resources to effect its payment obligations in all currencies when due, under a wide range of stress scenarios. As regards these liquid resources, the operator shall apply haircuts which are also appropriate under extreme but plausible market conditions. 3 When selecting stress scenarios, the operator shall, in particular, take into account the following stress events under extreme but plausible market conditions: a. the default of the participant or group of participants which would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation for the financial market infrastructure; b. additionally, for a central counterparty, the default of the two participants or two groups of participants which would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation for the central counterparty; c. the default of the largest liquidity pr
Para. 4 — SR 958.11 Para. 4 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307). Para. 5 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 30 Management of custody and investment risks
1 The operator shall identify, measure, manage and monitor its custody and investment risks through the use of appropriate procedures and tools. 2 If the operator places own assets or collateral and assets of participants in the custody of a third party, it shall minimise the associated risks. In particular, it shall place the collateral and assets concerned with creditworthy and, wherever possible, supervised financial institutions, and shall take measures to ensure that, if necessary, it can access the collateral and assets immediately. 3 The operator’s investment strategy shall be consistent with its risk management strategy and allow only liquid investments with minimal credit and market risks. The operator shall avoid risk concentrations and disclose the investment strategy vis-à-vis its participants, in particular regarding the possible re-use of the collateral they have provided.
Art. 31 Management of general business risk
1 The operator shall identify, measure, manage and monitor its general business risk through the use of appropriate procedures and tools. 2 In order to cover losses from general business risk, the operator shall hold capital and net liquidity. Such capital and net liquidity shall be sufficient to ensure the implementation of the plan specified in Article 26, and shall in any case be sufficient to cover current operating expenses for at least six months. 3 Collateral and other dedicated financial resources which are used to cover losses from participant defaults or from other credit or liquidity risks in accordance with Articles 28 and 29 must not be used to satisfy the requirement specified in paragraph 2. 4 The operator shall have a plan to raise additional capital in case the requirement specified in paragraph 2 is no longer fulfilled.
Para. 3 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 32 Management of operational risk
The operator shall identify, measure, manage and monitor its operational risk through the use of appropriate procedures and tools, particularly in order to ensure information security and business continuity, taking into account recognised standards.
Art. 32a Information security
1 The operator shall apply a company-wide approach and maintain an appropriate organisational structure with regard to planning, implementing, monitoring and improving the management of tasks and activities relating to information security (information security management). 2 The operator shall set appropriate targets with regard to the availability, integrity, confidentiality, auditability, authenticity, accountability and non-repudiation of information, particularly data in connection with transactions that are cleared or settled via the financial market infrastructure (information security objectives). 3 The operator shall take organisational and technical measures to ensure that the information security objectives are met during normal operations, during development and maintenance activities, and in times of increased transaction volumes. In particular, it shall take precautions enabling it to: a. identify, analyse and evaluate internal and external threats to information security
Para. 3 let. j — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 32b Business continuity
1 The operator shall apply a company-wide approach to maintaining or recovering business processes, in particular those business processes which are systemically important, in a timely manner in the event of damage or disruption. 2 The operator shall define the necessary resources (premises, staff, technical facilities, data, external service providers) for the individual business areas and assess the impact of any complete or partial loss or disruption of each of these resources with regard to business processes, in particular systemically important business processes (business impact analysis). The assessment shall include any interdependency among business areas and any dependency on external service providers. 3 Based on the business impact analysis, the operator shall define the maximum acceptable time before business processes are recovered, as well as the required degree of recovery (recovery objectives) and the associated resource requirements. The maximum acceptable time for r
Art. 32c Data centres
1 The operator shall have at least two data centres that meet high standards, particularly with regard to physical security, fire protection, power supply, cooling systems and telecommunications infrastructure. 2 The operator shall decide on the location of the data centres based on a risk analysis, and ensure that the data centres have different risk profiles and provide protection even in the event of a major incident adversely affecting a large geographical area. 3 The data centres and precautions taken to ensure their operation shall be appropriate for the fulfilment of the information security and recovery objectives specified in Articles 32a and 32b. If one of the data centres becomes inoperable, the operator shall ensure that, in particular, systemically important business processes can be continued within two hours at another data centre without the loss of any processing steps confirmed to participants.
Art. 32d Outsourcing
1 If the operator outsources significant services, it shall select its service providers with care and instruct them appropriately. 2 The operator shall integrate the outsourced services into its internal control system and monitor the performance of the service provider on an ongoing basis. 3 The operator shall, with regard to any outsourced services, remain responsible for compliance with the special requirements specified in this chapter. 4 The outsourcing contract shall, in particular, specify: a. the services to be rendered by the service provider; b. the possibilities for the National Bank, the operator or a mandated external party to examine – in full and without hindrance – the services outsourced to the service provider.
Art. 32d — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 33 Management of risk from indirect participation
If the financial market infrastructure has indirect participants and these are visible to the operator, the latter shall identify, measure, manage and monitor the risks to the financial market infrastructure arising from indirect participants.
Art. 34 Management of risk from links between financial market infrastructures
1 The operator shall identify, measure, manage and monitor risks arising from links to other financial market infrastructures. 2 If a central securities depository establishes a link with another central securities depository: a. the central securities depository shall use appropriate collateralisation measures to cover, with a high confidence level, the credit risk arising out of the granting of credit to the other central securities depository; b. the central securities depository shall permit the re-use of securities provisionally received from the other central securities depository only after the original transfer is unconditional and irrevocable; c. the central securities depository shall, in the case of indirect links, identify, measure, manage and monitor the risks arising due to intermediary financial institutions. d. the central securities depository shall, on a daily basis, match the holdings in its sub-custody with those it holds at other central securities depositories and
Para. 2 let. e — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Section 3 Assessment of Compliance with Special Re
Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 35 Obligation to provide information
The operator shall provide the National Bank or any third party designated by the latter with all the information and documentation that it requires for the assessment of compliance with the special requirements specified in this chapter.
Art. 35 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 36 Reporting obligations
1 The operator shall submit the following documentation and information to the National Bank: a. the annual report; b. the contractual framework; c. the organisational principles; d. the minutes of the board of directors’ meetings; e. the internal and external auditors’ reports; f. information on the participants; g. data on the clearing and settlement of payments and financial instruments and the central custody of securities; h. the plan specified in Article 26, to ensure the recovery or orderly wind-down of systemically important business processes, and the plan specified in Article 31 paragraph 4, to raise additional capital; i. the results of the risk controls specified in Articles 27–32a, 33 and 34; j. information on the availability of the data processing system, as well as on system failures and disruptions, including their causes and the action taken (operating statistics and production report); k. the business impact analysis, the business continuity strategy and the business
Art. 36 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 10 June 2013, in force since 1 July 2013 (AS 2013 1987). Para. 1 let. n — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307). Para. 3 let. b — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 37 On-site assessments
1 In order to assess compliance with the special requirements specified in this chapter, the National Bank may undertake on-site assessments of the financial market infrastructure or charge a third party with the performance of such assessments. 2 The operator shall have the adequacy and effectiveness of its risk management reviewed regularly by a qualified internal or external body. The National Bank may set requirements regarding the scope and depth of the assessments. 3 The operator shall have the adequacy and effectiveness of the procedures and tools used for the management of operational risk reviewed annually by a qualified external body. The National Bank shall, in consultation with the operator, define the scope and depth of the assessments.
Art. 37 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 10 June 2013, in force since 1 July 2013 (AS 2013 1987). Para. 1 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).
Art. 38 Procedure in cases of non-compliance with the special requirements
1 If a financial market infrastructure does not satisfy the special requirements specified in this chapter, the National Bank shall issue a recommendation to the operator. 2 The National Bank shall issue an order if the operator fails to comply with a corresponding recommendation as specified in paragraph 1. 3 Before issuing the recommendation specified in paragraph 1 or the order specified in paragraph 2, the National Bank shall provide the operator with the opportunity to express an opinion. If the financial market infrastructure is subject to authorisation and supervision by FINMA pursuant to Article 4 FinMIA, the National Bank shall first consult FINMA.
Art. 38 — Amended by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, in force since 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307). Para. 3 — SR 958.1
Art. 39
Repealed by No I of the SNB O of 26 Nov. 2015, with effect from 1 Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 5307).